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I 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Otero, Richard Facility: Otisville CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 93-A-2793 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
09-077-18 B 
Appearances: Richard Otero (93A2793) 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
57 Sanitarium Road, Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 16 
months. 
· Board Member(s) Crangle, Berliner. 
who partidpated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived January 8, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review:· Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Fer:;;; The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~ftirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo ·interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Co 
____ __,...__.f..p,.~-· _Affirmed _· _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's defermination !!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detetm.ination, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the separ.~fi?d~ngs of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, 1f any, on ~UI /12 ;{£. . 7 · / 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - AppelJant's Counsel - mst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 16-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was made in 
violation of lawful procedure relying too heavily upon Appellant’s ten (10) controlling felony 
convictions; (2) Appellant’s COMPAS instrument, family support, and other achievements were 
not provided sufficient weight by the Board; (3) the Board’s decision was made in violation of 
Appellant’s due process rights under the Constitution; (4) the Board’s decision was tantamount to 
a resentencing of Appellant; (5) the Board’s decision was conclusory and lacked sufficient detail; 
and (6) the 16-month hold was excessive. 
 As to the first issue and second issues, in his brief Appellant repeatedly refers to his “instant 
offense” (singular) when in fact he has ten (10) controlling felony convictions for the following 
crimes: (1) Attempted Murder first degree; (2) Attempted Murder second degree; (3) Robbery first 
degree; (4) Criminal Use of a Firearm first degree; (5) Attempted Aggravated Assault on a Peace 
Officer; (6) Robbery second degree; (7) Reckless Endangerment first degree; (8) Criminal 
Possession of a Weapon second degree; (9) Criminal Possession of a Weapon third degree; and 
(10) Attempted Promotion of Prison Contraband first degree. 
Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, 
this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY 
Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails to satisfy any one of the considerations 
set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter 
of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. 
Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 
834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
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parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment 
principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon 
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release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of 
rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole 
release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, 
for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—
that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also 
find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, 
or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly 
contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a presumption of 
release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. 
As to the third issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 
1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
  
As to the fourth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray 
v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
As to the fifth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
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As to the sixth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 16 months was not excessive or improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
